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Abstract: I introduce axiomatically infinite sequential games that extend Kuhn’s classical framework.
Infinite games allow for (a) imperfect information, (b) an infinite horizon, and (c) infinite action sets.
A generalized backward induction (GBI) procedure is defined for all such games over the roots of
subgames. A strategy profile that survives backward pruning is called a backward induction solution
(BIS). The main result of this paper finds that, similar to finite games of perfect information, the sets
of BIS and subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) coincide for both pure strategies and for behavioral
strategies that satisfy the conditions of finite support and finite crossing. Additionally, I discuss five
examples of well-known games and political economy models that can be solved with GBI but not
classic backward induction (BI). The contributions of this paper include (a) the axiomatization of a
class of infinite games, (b) the extension of backward induction to infinite games, and (c) the proof
that BIS and SPEs are identical for infinite games.
Keywords: subgame perfect equilibrium; backward induction; refinement; axiomatic game theory;
agenda setter; imperfect information; political economy
JEL Classification: C73
1. Introduction
The origins of backward induction are murky. Zermelo [1] analyzed winning in chess, asking
a question about the winning strategy for white in a limited number of moves, yet his method of
analysis was based on a different principle [2]. A couple of decades later, we find that reasoning
based on backward induction was implicit in Stackelberg’s [3] construction of his alternative to the
Cournot equilibrium. Then, as a general procedure for solving two-person, zero-sum games of perfect
information, backward induction appeared in von Neumann and Morgenstern’s [4] (p. 117) founding
book, which followed von Neumann’s [5] earlier question about optimal strategies. BI was also used
to prove a precursor of Kuhn’s Theorem for chess and similar games. Von Neumann’s exceedingly
complex formulation was later clarified and elevated to high theoretical status by Kuhn’s [6] work,
most especially, Corollary 1; Schelling’s [7] ideas about incredible threats; and Selten’s [8] introduction
of subgame perfection. However, it suffered drawbacks when the chain-store paradox, Centipede,
and other games brought into doubt its universal appeal [9,10]. Its profile was further lowered with
new refinements: perfect equilibrium [11], sequential equilibrium [12], and particular procedures such
as forward induction [13] offered solutions that often seemed more intuitive. The arguments against
applying backward induction began to multiply, sealing doubts about its universal validity [14–22].
The goal of the present paper is to extend backward induction to infinite games with imperfect
information and to investigate its relation to subgame perfection. In its standard formulation, backward
induction applies only to finite games of perfect information. In these cases, every backward induction
solution (BIS), i.e., a strategy profile that survives backward “pruning” (a subsequent substitution of
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terminal subgames with Nash-equilibrium payoffs), is also a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and all
SPEs result from backward pruning [23] yet it is common knowledge among game theorists that other
games can be solved through backward reasoning as well; they have routinely applied the procedure
to such games for half a century. Backward reasoning is implicit in refining the Stackelberg equilibrium
from other Nash equilibria (NE). Schelling analyzed backward the NE in the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma as early as in the 1950s [24]. Reputable textbooks, such as those by Fudenberg and Tirole [25]
(p. 72) and Myerson [26] (p. 192), make explicit claims—although without proofs—that backward
induction can be applied to a wider class of games. Osborne and Rubinstein [27] (p. 98, Lemma 98.2
on one deviation property) essentially extend backward induction to finite-horizon extensive games
with perfect information. Additionally, Escardó and Oliva [28] showed that BIS is equivalent to SPE in
certain well-founded games, i.e., games with perfect information, such that all paths must be finite,
even though they may be arbitrarily long. Moreover, backward reasoning is commonly applied to
solve various parametrized families of extensive-form games in political economy models. It is also
used implicitly when one argues that voters “vote sincerely ” in the last stage of various voting games
that have binary agendas.
What results from this alleged abuse? Perhaps most clearly, Fudenberg and Tirole [25] (p. 94) spell
out the underlying principle: “This is the logic of subgame perfection: Replace any ’proper subgame’
of the tree with one of its Nash-equilibrium payoffs, and perform backward induction on the reduced
tree.” With caveats discussed later in this introduction, Fudenberg and Tirole’s prescription captures
the essence of the generalized backward induction (GBI) approach. However, if one wanted to find an
entirely formal (i.e., axiomatic) justification for this algorithm in the literature, one would not be able
to do so, yet such a justification is necessary since, in fact, the principles behind SPE and BIS differ.
We can informally examine this petite difference. SPE is a strategy profile that is NE in all subgames.
Its intuitive justification focuses on subgames, i.e., smaller games within a larger one. SPE demands
that players interact “rationally” in all subgames, i.e., that they apply strategies resulting in NE in the
subgames. Unless a game has no other subgames than itself, backward induction concerns different
games. It starts at the game’s end and moves backward. Similar to SPE, the first game (or a set of
games) is a subgame. However, at some point, a new game appears that is not a subgame of the
original game and which has no counterpart in the SPE’s definition. Such a game (or games) is created
by substituting a subgame (or subgames) with an NE payoff vector in those subgames.
A simple example illustrates the distinction. In Figure 1, SPE in game G requires that Bob and
Alice play NE strategies in both the original game G and its subgame H. BIS requires that the players
play NE strategies in G’s subgame H and also the “upgame” J. J was created by “pruning” H, i.e.,
substituting the root of H with an endnode that had the NE payoffs in H assigned as payoffs.
Alice
Bob
Stop
Left              Right 
1, 1                0, 0
1, 1
Play
Alice Stop
1, 1
1, 1
Play
Original game G                     Subgame H                      “Upgame” J
Left              Right 
1, 1                0, 0
Bob
Figure 1. Backward induction versus subgame perfection.
Backward induction is helpful because the games that we need to solve when using its algorithm are
usually smaller and simpler than those that appear in the definition of the SPE. It seems such an obvious
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route toward finding SPEs that one can easily ignore the subtle difference in the definitions, especially
when one begins to struggle with the truly painful chore of defining BIS formally. Nevertheless, one
cannot state a priori that the sets of strategy profiles obtained in both cases are identical.
Despite the lack of a firm foundation, it seems that, within the discipline, backward induction has
acquired the status of a “folk algorithm”A˙lthough game theorists use it, it appears that little attention
has been paid to its rigorous examination. It clearly works—in the sense that it produces SPEs—but we
neither know exactly for what games it works nor precisely what it produces. The formal link between
the folk algorithm and subgame perfection remains obscure.
In the current paper, I investigate the “folk puzzle of backward induction” axiomatically.
The axiomatic framework that I introduce below encompasses more games than the finite games
axiomatized by either von Neumann and Morgenstern [4] or Kuhn [6]. Specifically, in this work,
the action sets may be infinite (more formally, they can have any cardinality) and the length of a
game may be infinite (denumerable). Despite its higher complexity, this new framework allows for a
constructive analysis.
The results of this work certify that, with some clarification, the folk wisdom linking BI and SPE is
correct for various sets of infinite games. Nevertheless, it is also clear that Fudenberg and Tirole’s [25]
prescription of applying BI over subgames has to be modified. The informal description of these
modifications is as follows:
First, backward pruning can be applied not only to pure strategies but also to certain
behavioral strategies.
Second, we must replace every subgame with an SPE and not an NE payoff vector. Obviously,
when a subgame has no other subgames than itself, SPE and NE coincide.
Finally, we can replace entire subsets of disjoint subgames simultaneously, not only single
subgames. Such simultaneous replacement is essential not only for solving many games that are
not finite but also for certain complex finite games, as it may be the only realistic way to proceed
(see Example 1).
Remarkably, in agreement with the case of finite games of perfect information, the findings show
that, for pure strategies and certain behavioral strategies, the sets of BIS and SPE coincide. This is the
main result of the present work. It legitimizes the informal methods of backward pruning of a game,
and it concatenates the resulting partial strategy profiles used by game theorists to solve games.
The generalized algorithm uses the agenda—the tree consisting of the roots of all subgames—instead
of the game tree. For games of perfect information, the agenda coincides with the game tree with terminal
nodes subtracted. A step in such an algorithm can informally be compared to the classic backward
induction as follows:
(1) Prune (remove) any subset of disjoint subgames instead of a single subgame, which would have
only one decision node followed by terminal nodes.
(2) Substitute all selected subgames with the SPE payoffs instead of the payoffs for best moves.
(3) Concatenate all partial strategy profiles obtained in the previous step; if at any point one gets an
empty set, this would mean that there is no SPE in the game.
The above three-step procedure can be applied to pure strategies in all games as well as to
behavioral strategies that satisfy the condition of finite support and crossing. Finding all SPEs requires
following particular rules for concatenating and discarding partial strategy profiles, as described in
Section 4 of this paper.
The next section introduces axiomatically sequential games with potentially infinite sets of actions
and an infinite horizon. While a more accurate label would be “potentially infinite ” here, I call such
games “infinite” for the sake of simplicity. Following the introduction of these games, I establish
the basic facts linking payoffs to strategies in infinite games. Then, in Section 3, I investigate the
decomposition of games into subgames and upgames for pure and behavioral strategies with finite
support and crossing. The reader who is more interested in applications may skip Sections 2 and 3
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and go directly to Section 4, where the GBI algorithm is formally described. Then, in the subsequent
section, I discuss five illustrative examples, including the application of the procedure to solve
parametrized games, which are often used in political economy modeling and an ad hoc generalization
that finds the unique perfect equilibrium. Finally, I conclude the paper in Section 6 with the remaining
open questions as well as suggestions for further research. All proofs are found in the Appendix A.
2. Preliminaries
Sequential (extensive-form) games were introduced with a set-theoretic axiomatization by von
Neumann and Morgenstern [4] (pp. 73–76). They were conceived and presented in the spirit of the
rigorous decoupling of syntax and semantics in the early 20th century, such as embodied in the works
of Hilbert and Tarski and, later, in Bourbaki’s team. In order to prevent a reader from forming any
geometric or other intuition, von Neumann [4] proudly announced that “we have even avoided
giving names to the mathematical concepts [. . . ] in order to establish no correlation with any meaning
which the verbal associations of names may suggest” (p. 74). Then, he dismissed his own idea of a
game tree, as “even relatively simple games lead to complicated and confusing diagrams, and so the
usual advantages of graphical representation do not obtain” (p. 77). Despite von Neumann’s every
effort to turn a sequential game into a highly abstract object, incomprehensible for nonmathematicians,
Kuhn’s [6] approach helped to make games more intuitive. Kuhn simplified von Neumann’s formalism
and built the axioms into definitions and assumptions about the tree, the players, and the information,
as well as slightly generalized von Neumann’s unnecessarily narrow definition.
The axiomatic setup of the current paper goes beyond finite games in an attempt to cover
axiomatically a larger class of extensive-form games. As mentioned above, for simplicity, such games
are called infinite games. The framework maintains the compatibility with Kuhn’s pragmatic exposition
and draws from the excellent modern presentations of finite games by Myerson [26] and Selten [11].
The axioms are divided into two subsets. The properties defining an infinite tree are listed explicitly;
the game axioms are combined with the description of the game components and specify how various
objects are attached to the tree. In order to establish some intuitive associations, I place in parentheses
the axioms’ names that succinctly describe their content.
The way in which games are introduced is laborious, but it helps later with the succinct
establishment of the basic results.
Rooted tree: Let (T,Ψ, τ) be such that T is a set of at least two points, Ψ is a binary relation over T,
and τ ∈ T. For y ∈ T, y 6= τ, a path to y of length k is any finite indexed set ey = {xi}ki=1 ⊂ T such that
x1 = τ, xk = y and for all i = 1, . . . , k− 1, (xi, xi+1) ∈ Ψ; for i 6= j, xi 6= xj. For y = τ, the path to τ is
{τ}. For an infinite indexed set, {xi} is an infinite path if for every xj ∈ {xi}, {xi}ji=1 is a finite path.
Ψ is termed a rooted tree with its root τ and the set of nodes T if the following properties (AT1-AT3)
are satisfied:
AT1 (partial anti-reflexivity): For all x ∈ T, (x, x) ∈ Ψ iff x = τ;
AT2 (symmetry): For all x, y ∈ T (x, y) ∈ Ψ iff (y, x) ∈ Ψ;
AT3 (unique path): For every x ∈ T, there is exactly one path ex to x.
The following definitions and notation are used hereafter (the definitions are slightly redundant):
1. Binary relations between two different nodes x, y:
Predecessor: y ∈ PR(x) (precedes x or is in the path to x) iff ey ⊂ ex;
Successor: y ∈ SU(x) (follows x) iff ex ⊂ ey;
Immediate predecessor: y = IP(x) (immediately precedes x) iff ex − ey = {x}
By AT1-AT3, for every x 6= τ, there is exactly one immediate predecessor.
Immediate successor: y ∈ IS(x) (immediately follows) x iff ey − ex = {y};
Immediate predecessor in Ti ⊂ T: For x, y ∈ Ti, y = IPi(x) (immediately precedes x in Ti) iff y ∈ PR(x)
and (ex − ey) ∩ Ti = {x}.
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By AT1-AT3, for every x and Ti, there is at most one immediate predecessor of x in Ti.
This definition allows us to import the relation of preceding from the game tree into a smaller tree
consisting of the roots of the game’s subgames (i.e., the game’s agenda). GBI will be conducted over
the agenda.
2. Single nodes, subsets of nodes, set of subsets of nodes
Endnode (terminal node): a node x that is not followed by any other node, i.e., SU(x) = ∅;
Set of all endnodes: TE;
Decision node: a node that is not an endnode;
Set of all decision nodes: TD = T − TE ;
Branch: any node except for the root τ. (In a standard definition, a branch is any element
(x, y) ∈ Ψ. For the simplicity of forthcoming notation, it is identified here with the node in the pair
that is farther from the root.)
Alternative (originating) at a node x: any immediate successor of x;
Terminal path: a path to an endnode or an infinite path;
Set of all terminal paths Tt.
Definition 1. Game: An n-player sequential game is a septuple G =
〈
Ψ, N0, {Ti}i∈N0 , I, A, h, P
〉
that
includes a rooted game tree Ψ and the following objects: players from N0 with their assigned decision nodes and
probability distributions for random moves {Ti}i∈N0 ; the pattern of information I; the identification of moves A;
the probability distributions over random (or pseudorandom) moves h; and the payoff function P.
The conditions imposed on the components of G and certain useful derived concepts are
defined below.
1. Game tree: Ψ is a rooted tree with a set of nodes T, a set of decision nodes TD, a set of endnodes
TE, and the root τ;
2. Players: For a positive integer n, N0 = {0, 1, . . . , n} consists of players N = {1, . . . , n} and
nature—a random or pseudorandom mechanism, labeled with 0;
3. Player partition: {Ti}i∈N0 is the partition of TD into (possibly empty) subses Ti and a (possibly
empty) subset T0 for nature. The following assumptions are made regarding T0:
(i) There is no path that includes an infinite number of nodes from T0; 1‘
(ii) For every x ∈ T0, the number of alternatives at x is greater or equal two and finite.
4. Information: I = {Ii}ni=0 is such that every Ii = {Iki }k∈Ki is a partition of i’s set Ti. We assume the
following:
(i) All elements of I0 are singletons;
(ii) For all i ∈ N, every element of Ii includes only nodes with equal numbers (or cardinalities)
of alternatives and does not include two nodes that are in the same path;
(iii) (Perfect Recall): If xi is a successor of xj and xk is in the same information set with xi, then xi
and xk must be immediate successors of either xj or some other node xl that is a successor
of xj.
For every i ∈ N0, a set Iki ∈ Ii is called i’s information set. A node y originates from the
information set Iki if y originates at a node x ∈ Iki .
5. Moves (actions): A = {Aki }i∈N,k∈Ki is a collection of partitions, one for every information set Iki of
every player i, of all alternatives originating at Iki , such that for any node x ∈ Iki , every member of
Aki includes exactly one alternative that originates at x. The elements a ∈ Aki are called the moves
(or actions) of i at Iki . For any I
k
0 , the moves at I
k
0 are singletons, including branches originating at
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Ik0 . By definition, since every branch y belongs to precisely one move, for y ∈ T− {τ} the move a
such that y ∈ a is denoted by Aki (y).
6. Random moves: h is a function that assigns to every information set of the random mechanism
Ik0 = {x} a probability distribution {hk} over the alternatives at x, with all probabilities being
positive. If T0 = ∅, h is not defined.
7. Payoffs (associated with terminal paths): The payoff function P = (P1, . . . , Pn) : N× Tt → R assigns to
every terminal path e ∈ Tt a payoff vector at e equal to P(e) = (P1(e), . . . , Pn(e)). The component
Pi(e) is called the payoff of player i at e. Function Pi is called the payoff function of player i.
Both infinite paths and infinite numbers of moves at the players’ information sets are allowed.
The assumed constraints demand that the numbers of players, the random information sets at every
path, and the random moves at every random information set are finite. Another restriction is the
discrete temporal structure of moves implied by the definition of game tree. Such a restriction excludes
differential games and, in general, games in continuous time. Finally, games like stochastic games are
conceptualized differently than extensive-form games (see, e.g., Reference [29]. Hereafter, the word
“game” refers to Definition 1.
The most extensively studied subset of infinite games are finite games:
Finite game: G is finite if its set of nodes T is finite.
The concepts that follow are derived from the model’s primitives.
Subgame: For any game G = 〈Ψ, N0, {Ti}i∈N0 , I, A, h, P〉, a subgame of G is any game G′ =
〈Ψ′, N0, {T′i }i∈N0 , I′, A′, h′, P′〉, such that
(i) Ψ′ is a subtree of Ψ, i.e., for some τ′ ∈ T, T′ = {x ∈ T : x = τ′ or x ∈ SU(τ′)} and Ψ′ =
(Ψ ∩ [T′ × T′]) ∪ {(τ′, τ′)};
(ii) If x1, x2 ∈ Iki for some Iki in G, then either {x1, x2} ⊂ T′ or {x1, x2} ∩ T′ = ∅ (either both x1 and
x2 are in T′ or neither is);
(iii) The sets of players are identical (N0) and {T′i }i∈N0 , I′, A′, h′, P′ are restrictions of {Ti}i∈N0 , I, A,
h, P to T′, respectively.
It is straightforward that restrictions in (iii) define a game and that “being a subgame” is a
transitive relation.
A player i may be a dummy in a game, i.e., Ti may be empty. Since |T| ≥ 2, the root of Ψ is a
decision node and there must be at least one player or random mechanism in the game. Without loss
of generality, one can assume that there are no dummies in the initial game G for which all results
are formulated.
Below, the strategies are defined in order to optimize the introduction of the fundamental
ideas—for this paper—of strategy concatenation and decomposition. The adjective “behavioral”
is optional since behavioral strategies are our departure point for defining other types of strategies.
Behavioral actions: A behavioral action of finite support (in short, a behavioral action) αki of player i at
the information set Iki is a finite probability distribution over the set of actions A
k
i .
A behavioral action at any information set assigns positive probabilities only to a finite number of
actions at this set. When I refer to “finite support,” I will also mean the assumption in the definition of
a game that the number of random actions is also finite.
Strategies (rough behavioral): A rough behavioral strategy βi of player i is any (possibly empty) set
of i’s behavioral actions that includes exactly one behavioral action per information set of i. A partial
rough behavioral strategy ωi is any subset of a rough strategy. A partial rough strategy that includes
exactly those actions in βi that are defined for information sets of i in a subgame H of G is denoted as
βHi and is called βi reduced to H.
The possibility of having an empty set of i’s behavioral actions represents a trivial strategy of
player i in a subgame where i makes no moves. A rough behavioral strategy may be assembled from
any set of actions. Below, this option is restricted to rough strategies that satisfy finite crossing.
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For any rough strategy βi, we denote the probability assigned by βi at Iki to a move ai by βi(I
k
i )(ai).
A path e is called relevant for βi if βi chooses every alternative in e that originates from some information
set of i with a positive probability, i.e., if for every node y ∈ e such that y ∈ IS(x) for some x ∈ Ti,
βi(Iki )(A
k
i (y)) > 0. Finally, a path e crosses I
k
i if e ∩ Iki 6= ∅.
Finite crossing in subgames: For every i ∈ N, a rough strategy βi is said to satisfy finite crossing in
the subgames if for every subgame H of G and every path eH in H that is relevant for βi reduced to
H, βHi , e
H crosses only a finite number of information sets from Ii, such that the distribution βi(Iki ) is
nondegenerate, i.e., it assigns positive probabilities to at least two actions.
Behavioral strategy: For any i ∈ N, a behavioral strategy of i—or simply, a strategy of i—is any
rough strategy of i that satisfies finite crossing in subgames.
Comment: Finite support and finite crossing guarantee that, in all subgames, the payoffs (to be
defined later) for behavioral strategies can be derived from a finite probability distribution. The class
of strategies that satisfy these conditions includes, among others, all behavioral strategies in a finite
game and all pure strategies in any game. Relaxing these conditions would introduce complications of
a measure-theoretic nature along the lines examined by Aumann [30]. It is unclear whether the results
would survive a more general treatment of behavioral strategies.
All behavioral strategies of i form i’s behavioral strategy space Bi. Elements of B = ×ni=1Bi, are
called behavioral strategy profiles and are denoted by β.
I use a set-theoretic interpretation of strategies that will greatly simplify the definitions of strategy
decomposition and concatenation as well as the treatment of partial strategy profiles. There is a simple
isomorphism between strategy profiles defined in a set-theoretic and standard way. Thus, every
strategy profile β is interpreted as a union of players’ strategies (which are obviously disjoint); the
Cartesian product ×ni=1Bi is interpreted as taking all possible unions of individual strategies, one
per player; the notation for the strategy profile (βi)ni=1 represents an alternative notation for ∪ni=1βi.
One example of the notational difficulty that is avoided is the interpretation of ×ni=1Bi when at least
one strategy set is empty. Another example is provided by the next definition.
A strategy profile βwith the strategy of player i removed, i.e., β−βi, is denoted by β−i ∈ ×N−{i}Bi;
(β−i,γi) denotes β with βi substituted with γi, that is, β−βi ∪ γi.
When such a distinction is necessary, the payoff functions, strategies, strategy profiles, etc.
in games or in subgames G and H will be given the identifying superscripts PG, PH , etc.
The most important step toward building the framework for infinite games is expressing payoffs
in terms of strategies.
Recall that the probability assigned by βi at Iki to a move ai was denoted by βi(I
k
i )(ai). For any
x, y ∈ T—such that x ∈ IS(y) and y ∈ Iki —and x ∈ ai, the probability of the move to x is defined as
pmβ (x) = βi(I
k
i )(ai). By convention, p
m
β (τ) = 1 for all β. A path e is included in β if p
m
β (x) > 0 for
all x ∈ e, and it is denoted as e ⊂ β. The set of all terminal paths included in β is denoted by Tβ.
The probability of playing e under β, pβ(e), is defined as follows:
pβ(e) =∏
x∈e
pmβ (x)
Thus, pβ(e) is the product of the probabilities assigned by β to all alternatives in e. Note that by
the definition of the game and the behavioral strategy’s finite support of crossing, for a path of infinite
length, only a finite number of alternatives may be assigned probabilities different than zero or one.
The multiplication over an infinite series of numbers has at least one zero equal to zero, and an infinite
product of ones is equal to one.
The probability of reaching a node y, pβ(y), is defined as the probability of playing ey under β:
pβ(y) = pβ(ey) = ∏
x∈ey
pmβ (x).
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The assumptions of finite support and finite crossing are used below to establish the fundamental
fact that pβ defines a probability distribution over a finite subset of all terminal paths.
Lemma 1. For every game G and every subgame H of G and with the behavioral strategy profile β,
(a) the set of all terminal paths in H included in βH , TβH , is non-empty and finite;
(b) for every eH ∈ THt , pHβ (eH) > 0 iff eH ∈ TβH ;
(c) Σe∈T
βH
pβH (e) = 1.
Lemma 1 establishes that the probability distributions associated with actions of every behavioral
strategy in a profile define a finite probability distribution on the set of all terminal paths. This allows
us to extend the definition of the payoffs that were originally defined only for terminal paths to all
behavioral strategy profiles of finite support and finite crossing.
Payoffs (for behavioral strategy profiles): For every behavioral strategy profile β ∈ B, Pi(β) =
Σe∈TβPi(e)× pβ(e) for i = 1, . . . , n.
In the spirit of conserving letters, the original letter P that denotes payoffs assigned to the terminal
paths is recycled here.
Finally, pure strategies are defined as a special case of behavioral strategies.
Pure strategies: βi, such that βi(Iki ) is always degenerate, i.e., picks only one action with certainty,
is called a pure strategy and is denoted by pii. For pure strategies, the notation pi is used in place of β
and Π is used in place of B.
Decomposition of strategies: The definitions offered below introduce certain partial strategies or
strategy profiles for G and β:
βH is β reduced to H if βH = ∪ni=1βHi ;
β−Hi is a complement of βi with respect to H if β
−H
i = βi − βHi ;
β−H = ∪ni=1β−Hi is a complement of β with respect to H;
B−Hi is the set of all β
−H
i for all βi ∈ Bi;
B−H = ×ni=1B−Hi .
Let δHi : Bi → BHi × B−Hi denote the decomposition function for player i, which assigns to βi its
reduced strategy βHi and its complement β
−H
i . The decomposition function δ
H : B → BH × B−H is
defined as (δHi )
n
i=1. The following simple but useful result holds for every game G and its subgame H:
Lemma 2. (a) For every i, δHi is 1-1 and onto;
(b) δH is 1-1 and onto.
Lemma 2 allows us to define the function of the concatenation of strategies that is the inverse
of decomposition: For every subgame H of G and every pair of partial strategy profiles βH ∈ BH
and β−H ∈ B−H , σH(βH , β−H) = βH ∪ β−H is such that σHδH(βH) = βH . Moreover, σH = (σHi )ni=1,
where every σHi is the inverse of a respective δ
H
i . Similar to δ
H , both σH and all its all components σHi
are 1-1 and onto.
The final two definitions of this section introduce two familiar equilibrium concepts [8,31]. For any
game G and the strategy profile β ∈ B, the equilibrium conditions for β are stated as follows:
Nash equilibrium (NE): For every i ∈ N, βi ∈ ArgMaxti∈Bi Pi(β−i, ti);
Subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE): For every subgame H, βH is an NE in H.
Analogous definitions hold when all considered strategies are pure.
3. Decomposition of Strategies
The notations si, s, Si, S, etc. are used to denote the strategies, strategy profiles, strategy spaces,
joint strategy spaces, etc. that are either pure or behavioral in order to process both cases simultaneously.
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Lemma 2 guarantees that the operations δ and σ are well defined and that they bring unique outcomes
within the same family of strategies. Obviously, the family of pure strategies has the same property.
Moreover, the definition of finite support of every strategy guarantees that the outcomes of δ and σ
have finite support.
The profiles s or sG denote any strategy profiles in G, and sHand s−H (or sG−H) denote their
decomposition with respect to its subgame H.
The sets Ts(G−H) and Ts(H) denote all terminal paths from Ts that do not include the root of H, φ,
or that do include φ, respectively:
Ts(G−H) = {e ∈ Ts such that φ /∈ e};
Ts(H) = {e ∈ Ts such that φ ∈ e}.
Lemma 3 states that the payoff in any game G from any strategy profile s is the sum of the payoffs
from all terminal paths that do not include φ and the payoff of s reduced to H multiplied by the
probability of reaching φ.
Lemma 3. PG(s) = psG (φ)P
H(sH) + Σe∈Ts(G−H) psG (e)P
G(e).
Upgame: For any game G = 〈Ψ, N0, {Ti}i∈N0 , I, A, h, P〉, an upgame of G (with respect to a subgame
H) is any game F= 〈Ψ′, N0, {T′i }i∈N0 , I′, A′, h′, P′〉 if (a) Ψ′ is a subtree of Ψ such that φ, the root of H in
G, and all nodes that follow φ are substituted with a terminal node φ in F and a payoff vector PF(φ)
that is of the same dimension as the payoffs in G and (b) the players are unchanged and {T′i }i∈N0 ,
I′, A′, h′, and P′ are the restrictions of f , I, A, h, and P to Ψ′, respectively (with φ excluded from the
restriction).
The demonstration that such restrictions define a game is straightforward. In a similar fashion,
we can substitute any non-empty set of disjoint subgames of G. Every game resulting from such an
operation is also called an upgame.
(s,Θ)-upgame: F is an upgame of G with respect to a strategy profile s and a non-empty set of the
disjoint subgames {Hθ}θ∈Θ of G, where φθ is a root of Hθ if PF(φθ) = PHθ (sHθ ). If for each Hθ , sHθ is
SPE, then F is called a perfect upgame. If |Θ| = 1, the notation is (s, H)-upgame
An upgame is obtained when we substitute the roots of disjoint subgames from a set Θ with
arbitrary payoff vectors. When such vectors result from a strategy profile s acting in the respective
subgames, it is an (s,Θ)-upgame. It becomes a perfect upgame when every sHθ is SPE in H. Note that
the classical backward induction prunes game trees by building perfect upgames one at a time.
It is useful to note a few facts. For a family of subgames {Hθ}θ∈Θ, no perfect upgames may exist
or, alternatively, there may be multiple perfect upgames. If a subgame Hθ has no SPE, then no perfect
upgame exists for Hθ and no SPE exists for the entire game.
Let F be an (s,H)-upgame of G for any strategy profile s ∈ S. The following Lemma states a
simple relationship between the payoffs in G and F.
Lemma 4. PG(s) = PF(s−H).
The next result characterizes the fundamental aspect of pruning a game. Since the concatenation
and reduction of strategies will be applied to the subgames of subgames, we need additional notations:
sHJ is a strategy profile s reduced to a subgame H and then further reduced to J—a subgame of
H; additionally, sH−J is a complement of sJ in H. Similar notations are applied to individual strategies
and payoff profiles.
For any game G and any of its proper subgames H and for any strategy profile s, let F be the (s,
H)-upgame of G.
Theorem 1. (decomposition): The following conditions are equivalent:
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(a) s is an SPE for G;
(b) sH is an SPE for H, and s−H is an SPE for F.
The Decomposition Theorem states that every SPE can be obtained by the concatenation of two
SPE subgame-upgame profiles and that every concatenation of two SPE profiles produces an SPE.
Agenda: Consider the graph that includes the roots of all subgames of G, that has the same root
as G, and of which the successor relationship is imported from Ψ. It is clear that such a graph is a
game tree. By its obvious association with voting models, it is called the agenda of G, and the set of all
agenda nodes is denoted by TA.
Subgame level: For a subgame H of game G with a root φ, the level of H is the total number of
nodes that are followed by φ in the agenda of G (including both τ and φ).
It is clear that the level of any subgame here is a positive integer.
Lemma 5. For any game G, any positive integer k, and any two different subgames H and J of G of level k, the
sets of nodes of H and J are disjoint.
Lemma 5 implies that we can substitute any set of subgames of the same level with payoffs of
the appropriate dimension and obtain an upgame of F. Removing all subgames at the same level is
convenient, and this assumption appears in many applications. However, it is sufficient to assume that
all removed subgames are disjoint.
Theorem 1 is now extended to any set of disjoint subgames.
For any game G, any subset of disjoint subgames {Hθ}θ∈Θ of G, and any profile s in G, let F be
the (s, Θ)-upgame of G.
Theorem 2. (simultaneous decomposition): The following conditions are equivalent:
(a) s is an SPE for G;
(b) sF is an SPE for F, and for all θ ∈ Θ, sHθ is an SPE for Hθ .
4. Generalized backward Induction (GBI) Algorithm
Theorem 2 legitimizes a general procedure of backward induction for any game and the pure
or behavioral strategies of finite support and finite crossing. GBI proceeds up the game tree by
concatenating partial SPE strategy profiles in consecutive disjoint sets of subgames.
Let us fix the game G.
Pruning sequence: The sequence of pruning {Θj}lj=1 is a partition of TA, the set of agenda nodes,
where l is a positive integer, l ≥ 2, such that for all k, m ∈ {1, . . . , l}, if χ ∈ Θk follows ψ ∈ Θm, then
k ≤ m.
The pruning sequence denotes the order of removing the subgames, with Θj denoting the roots
of the subgames removed in step j. The condition imposed on {Θj}lj=1 asserts that a subgame J of a
subgame H is pruned before or, simultaneously with, H.
Let us consider the agenda and all possible pruning sequences for a simple example of pure
coordination with perfect information (see Figure 2).
The agenda of pure coordination includes three nodes: A1, B1, and B2. There are six possible
pruning sequences: {B1}-{B2}-{A1}; {B2}-{B1}-{A1}; {B1, B2}-{A1}; {B1}-{B2, A1}; {B2}-{B1, A1}; and {B1,
B2, A1}. According to the first two sequences, single subgames are pruned; in the remaining sequences,
pruning includes removing two or three subgames at the same time. The condition imposed on the
pruning sequence guarantees that A1 is pruned in the last step, possibly with other nodes.
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Alice
Bob
L                  R
a              b                 c               d
1, 1                0, 0     0, 0                 1, 1
B1 B2
A1
Figure 2. Pure coordination with perfect information.
Finding a backward induction solution (BIS) begins with the entire game G = G1. In every step
of pruning, a new perfect upgame Gj+1 of Gj is created according to the pruning sequence {Θj}lj=1.
A BIS exists if, for at least one sequence of pruning, such a sequence of perfect upgames can be found:
Backward induction solution (BIS): Strategy profile s is a BIS according to the pruning sequence
{Θj}lj=1 if (a) there is a set of games {Gj}lj=1 such that G1=G and for j = 1, . . . , l − 1, Gj+1 is a perfect
(s, Θ)-upgame of Gj.
In other words, s is BIS if we can prune a game using s in such a way that, at every stage, s is an
SPE in the removed subgames and s is also an SPE in the the final upgame that results from pruning.
Let us go back to pure coordination. Consider the pruning sequence B1-B2-A1. After the removal
of the first subgame, we replace the root of this subgame B1 with the SPE payoff (1,1). The set of partial
SPEs includes one partial strategy a: SSPE1 = {(a)}. In the second step, after removal of B2, the new
partial strategy d is concatenated with the previously obtained partial strategy and SSPE2 = {(ad)}.
In the final step, both L and R are the SPE in the final perfect upgame and they can be concatenated
with the previously obtained partial strategy: SSPE3 = {(ad; L), (ad; R)}.
We have now the tools that allow us to examine the relationship between SBIS and SSPE. For a
fixed game G and a set of strategy profiles (behavioral or pure) S, let us denote the subset of all
BISs with SBIS and the subset of all SPEs by SSPE. Using our definition of BIS as resulting from any
sequence of pruning, if s is SPE, then for l = 2, by Theorem 2, s is also BIS. Conversely, if s is a BIS,
then we can find a pruning sequence {Θj}lj=1 that satisfies the conditions from the definition of BIS.
Theorem 2 applied l − 1 times guarantees that s is SPE. The relationship between subgame perfection
and backward induction can now be stated formally. It is straightforward:
Corollary 1. For any game G, BSPE = BBIS and ΠSPE = ΠBIS.
A simple consequence of Corollary 1 (in combination with Theorem 2) is that if s is BIS with one
pruning sequence, then it must be BIS with any pruning sequence. The only differentiating factor is
the convenience of using one sequence over another.
The following algorithm describes finding all SPEs:
Generalized Backward Induction (GBI) Algorithm:
1. Initial pruning: Set a pruning sequence {Θj}lj=1 with the subgames {Hθ}θ∈Θj of consecutive
upgames of G pruned in step j. Set the initial set of partial strategy profiles SSPE1 , defined as the set
of all partial strategy profiles in G that are SPE for all subgames of G with roots from Θ1, i.e., for
{Hθ}θ∈Θ1 .
2. Verification of partial SPEs: In step j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ l, the procedure generated SSPEj .
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If j = l, set SSPE = SSPEl and stop. Otherwise:
If j < l and SSPEj = ∅, then set S
SPE = ∅ and stop.
If j < l and SSPEj 6= ∅, then go to 3.
At step j, set SSPEj is the set of all partial strategy profiles that were obtained for the pruned
subgames up to the level Θj. If SSPEj is empty for any j, this implies that set S
SPE is also empty.
A non-empty SSPEj may include more than one partial strategy profile.
3. Concatenation: Let us denote the elements of SSPEj by s
k
j , for k ∈ K. For every skj ∈ SSPEj , perform
the following procedure for every sΘj+1 , a partial strategy profile for all subgames {Hθ}θ∈Θj+1 . Exactly
one of the following must hold:
(i) sΘj+1 is an SPE for all {Hθ}θ∈Θj+1 . In such a case, include skj∪sΘj+1 in SSPEj+1 ;
(ii) sΘj+1 is not an SPE for at least one of {Hθ}θ∈Θj+1 . In such a case, discard skj ∪ sΘj+1 .
In every step of concatenation, each partial strategy profile from SSPEj is checked against each
partial strategy profile for the next set of subgames. If the concatenation of both profiles produces an
SPE, it is included in the next set of partial SPEs, SSPEj+1 . Otherwise, it is discarded.
4. Increase j by one and go back to 2.
5. Examples
Below, I discuss five examples of applying the GBI algorithm. At every step, instead of moving
the payoff vectors up—which is the ordinary BI procedure—the set of partial SPEs is created. The final
set includes all SPEs. Also, note that in all five examples, unlike ordinary BI, GBI prunes many
subgames simultaneously.
Although GBI helps to solve some games, one should mention its restrictions. A rather obvious
limitation is that if a game’s agenda is a singleton—meaning that it has no proper subgames—then
GBI offers no benefit, as no pruning is possible. Moreover, for an infinitely repeated game, such
as the Prisoner’s Dilemma [32,33], replacing an infinitely long subgame or subgames with an SPE
is essentially equivalent to figuring out an SPE for the entire game. The usefulness of the method
depends mostly on the structure of the agenda.
5.1. Complex Finite Games with Perfect Information
In this classic case, the agenda is identical to the game tree minus the endnodes. Finding an SPE
in every subgame is equivalent to finding the best move (or the best moves) of a player. If payoffs
at some stage are identical, one may obtain many SPEs. The existence of a BIS for finite games was
proved by Kuhn’s Corollary 1 [6] (p. 61).
Even a finite game—if it is complex—may benefit from the GBI algorithm.
Example 1. Pick 100: Alice starts the game by picking any positive integer x ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}. Next, Bob picks
a greater integer y, such that (y− x) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}. Then, Alice picks z, such that (z− y) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10},
etc. The game ends when someone picks at least 100. The winner’s payoff is 1; the loser’s payoff is −1.
The game is finite, but close pruning required by classic BI is unrealistic due to the enormity of
the game tree. For instance, there are 512 subgames with their roots labeled with 10. This is the total
number of different paths that lead from 0 to a subgame that begins with 10. With the label increasing,
the number of corresponding subgames increases quickly.
What is the “solution” to this game? It can be described intuitively (the solution is presented
at the end of the example), but its relation to SPE is unclear. Moreover, the calculation of all SPEs is
complicated. The GBI helps by applying simultaneous pruning of large sets of disjoint subgames.
The sequence of pruning includes all maximal subgames labeled with certain numbers,
as described below.
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First step: Starting from 90–99, a player’s best action is to pick 100. Thus, we have to replace
all maximal subgames with roots of at least 90 with the corresponding payoffs (1,−1) or (−1, 1),
depending on whether the player is Alice or Bob. There are 10 types of subgames labeled 90–99 per
player, but the number of subgames of the same type is very large since they can be reached via
many different paths. Figure 3 shows the three simplest types of subgames pruned in Step 1 that
correspond to the previously picked numbers of 99, 98, and 97 (players and player payoffs are not
represented). SPE strategy profiles are marked in bold. Set SSPE1 includes simply all strategy profiles,
“pick 100 in all subgames labeled 90–99, and their subgames.” Exactly one partial strategy profile
satisfies this requirement.
Figure 3. The tree types of subgames pruned in Step 1.
Second step: Since all subgames starting with 90–99 were pruned, the greatest remaining number
is 89. The player who picks 89 wins, because the other player is now forced to pick a number between
90 and 99. Thus, in this step, we prune all subgames that begin with 89. The losing player, who must
choose a number between 90 and 99, has the only available payoff of −1. Thus, any partial strategy
profile is SPE in all subgames. When such profiles are concatenated with the single profile from SSPE1 ,
we obtain the following second set of partial SPEs that can be defined informally as follows:
SSPE2 = {s : from 89, pick anything; from 90–99 and their subgames, always pick 100}
Third step: Now, picking 89 means winning the game since, in the new upgame, all endnodes
labeled with 89 are terminal and offer the payoff of 1. We can prune all maximal subgames that start
with a number between 79 and 88. The single best action for both players is to pick 89. The SPE partial
strategy profile satisfies the condition “always pick 89”.
Next steps: Similarly, the player who picks 79–88 loses; the player who picks 78 wins, since the next
player must pick 79–88 and so on. In the last step, it turns out that Alice can pick 1, the first number in
the winning sequence. Her winning sequence of moves is concatenated from 20 levels of pruning with
the picks of 1, 12, 23, 34, 45, 56, 67, 78, 89, and 100 regardless of Bob’s choices. An interesting property
of the game Pick 100 is that, despite the game’s complexity, defining Alice’s ten crucial types of actions
guarantees her a winning path. There is a large number of SPEs:
SSPE = {s : both players pick one of the numbers 1, 12, 23, 34, 45, 56, 67, 78, 89, and 100 if they can
do that and anything if they cannot}
Certain strategies that are not part of any SPE can guarantee Alice winning as long as she chooses
the sequence of ten magical numbers. For instance, since she is not starting the game with 2, then
whatever she would choose in the subgame following 2 would not upset her winning path that starts
with 1.
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Now, we can define a “solution” to Pick 100 and similar games as a much simpler object than an
SPE: A solution is any minimal set of actions that guarantees some player a winning path.
5.2. Continuum of Actions and Perfect Information
Examples of nonfinite games of perfect information include various games of fair division [34,35],
the Romer–Rosenthal Agenda Setter model [36], and the Ultimatum game. The algorithm for such
games closely resembles classic backward induction. Below, I will demonstrate how GBI solves the
Agenda Setter model.
Example 2. Romer–Rosenthal Agenda Setter model.
Two players, Agenda Setter A and Legislator L, have Euclidean preferences in the issue space
[0, 3] and the ideal points 0 and 2, respectively. The status quo is q = 3. The dynamics are as follows:
Stage 1: A proposes a policy x ∈ [0, 3).
Stage 2: L chooses the law from {x, q}.
The Agenda Setter model defines a unique game G with the following components:
ΠA = [0, 3);ΠL = {X : X ⊂ [0, 3)}
Every strategy profile includes (x, X), where x is a policy proposed by A, and set X represents all
policies that L would accept.
PA(x, X) =
{
−x
−3
if x ∈ X
if x /∈ X
PL(x, X) =
{
−|x− 2|
−1
if x ∈ X
if x /∈ X
The payoff of A is the negative distance between A’s ideal point, 0, and the new law. It is equal to
−x if x is accepted by L, and it is equal to −3 if L rejects x. L’s payoff is defined similarly.
Both GBI steps correspond to one subgame level. The adopted pruning sequence simultaneously
removes all subgames at the same level. Here, we are only interested in pure strategies.
Step 1: At level two, there is a continuum of subgames parametrized by the issue space [0, 3).
When x ∈ [0, 3) is proposed, L has two options: to accept it or to reject it (which implies that q is
accepted). For a subgame with its root at x, the best actions for L are the following:
If x < 1, reject x;
If x > 1, accept x;
If x = 1, reject or accept x.
Applying simultaneous pruning to level 2 brings our first set of partial SPEs, with two partial SPE
profiles equal to two strategies of L:
SSPE1 = {[1, 3), (1, 3)}, i.e., “accept every offer not smaller than 1”and “accept every offer greater
than 1”.
The two partial strategy profiles produce two perfect upgames G1 and G2 with player A and their
strategy space [0, 3), where their payoffs differ only for x = 1 and are defined as follows:
G1 : PA(x) =
{
−3
−x
if x < 1
if x ≥ 1
G2 : PA(x) =
{
−3
−x
if x ≤ 1
if x > 1
Step 2: Now, we consider both partial strategy profiles from SSPE1 , i.e., [1, 3) and (1, 3).
Games 2019, 10, 34 15 of 25
Partial strategy profile [1, 3): The unique best action for A in G1 is x = 1 since it maximizes
A’s payoff among the options that are acceptable to L with PA(1; [1, 3)) = −1. When this move is
concatenated with [1, 3), the resulting SPE for the entire game is (1; [1, 3));
Partial strategy profile (1, 3): There is no best action for A in G2 since L’s set of acceptable payoffs
[−3,−1) does not include its upper bound. Partial profile (1, 3) is discarded.
Solution: There is a unique SPE in G, SSPE = {(1; [1, 3))}. In the SPE, A offers 1 and L accepts.
5.3. Finitely Repeated Games
An interesting case arises when a finite game is finitely repeated.
First, let us assume that G has precisely one equilibrium in behavioral strategies. Let Gk be G
repeated k times, k ≥ 2. When close pruning is applied, there is precisely one possible SPE in every
removed subgame of Gk that corresponds to the SPE in G. When all subgames of the same level
are pruned, the resulting game is Gk−1 plus a fixed payoff adjustment for all players equal to the
equilibrium payoff in G, which does not affect the equilibrium. This fact implies the following result (s
denotes either the pure or behavioral strategy):
Corollary 2. For any finite game G that has a unique SPE s and for any integer k ≥ 2, Gk has exactly one SPE
that is equal to the repeated concatenation of s.
A consequence of Corollary 2 is the well-known fact that such finitely repeated games as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma or Matching Pennies have exactly one SPE in pure and behavioral strategies, respectively.
When a one-shot game has many SPEs, different equilibria may contribute different payoff vectors
to the upgames. Nevertheless, GBI may simplify the calculations.
Example 3. Twice-repeated pure coordination.
In one-shot pure coordination (PC), Alice and Bob simultaneously choose one of their two
strategies (refer to the game shown in Figure 2 plus imperfect information). There are two levels in the
twice-repeated PC. Our sequence of pruning once again coincides with the levels.
Step 1: There are four subgames at level two, with three NEs in each subgame: (L; L), (R; R), and
the NE in completely mixed strategies ( 12 ,
1
2 ). This produces 81 partial strategy profiles that are NEs;
16 of them are in pure strategies. The sets of partial SPEs in pure and behavioral strategies are defined
as follows, respectively:
ΠSPE1 = {y, z, v, w such that y, z, v, w ∈ {(L; L), (R; R)}};
BSPE1 = {y, z, v, w such that y, z, v, w ∈ {(L; L), (R; R), ( 12 ; 12 )}}.
Step 2: At this point, it makes sense to separate the cases of pure and behavioral strategies.
Pure strategies: In this easy case, every partial profile from ΠSPE1 obtained in Step 1 adds exactly
1 to the payoff in the upgame. Thus, for every partial strategy profile obtained in Step 1, there are
two SPEs in the upgame, i.e., the coordination on L or on R. Consequently, there are 32 SPEs in pure
strategies that can be described as follows:
ΠSPE = {x, y, z, v, w such that x, y, z, v, w ∈ {(L; L), (R; R)}}.
Behavioral strategies: Each perfect upgame that results from pruning all four subgames has
exactly three NEs. In every upgame, players receive the payoffs of 1 12 or 2 for coordinating their
strategies and 1 or 12 for discoordination. Thus, every perfect upgame is either PC or a variant of
asymmetric coordination having exactly two NEs in pure strategies and one NE in completely mixed
strategies. Each of the 81 partial strategy profiles from Step 1 can be concatenated with the three NEs
in the upgame. The total number of SPEs in behavioral strategies is 243.
By not enumerating all behavioral SPEs, I will conserve space for the next example.
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5.4. Parametrized Games in Political Economy
In the field of political economy, typical models are often represented as parametrized families
of games (in short, parametrized games). SPE is often an appropriate solution concept. As the next
example, I apply a simplified Auto-Lustration (AL) model [37], which is a more complex version
of the Agenda Setter model, motivated by the surprising behavior of postcommunist parties in the
1990s. When such parties returned to power in some Central European countries, just before the end
of their terms, they started legislating light auto-lustration. In other words, they were punishing
their own members for being former supporters of communism! The term “lustration” signifies some
punishment imposed on former functionaries or on the secret informers of communist regimes such as
making their names public or blacklisting them from certain public offices.
Example 4. Auto-Lustration.
A postcommunist party (P) and an anti-communist party (A) have Euclidean preferences over the
lustration space [0, 1]. P’s ideal amount of lustration is zero; for A, the ideal amount is one. There is
also a smaller moderate party, M, whose ideal point is slightly tilted to the right m > 12 . M has no
chance of winning a majority and will join a postelection coalition only with A.
The game unfolds as follows (recall that the dynamics are simplified and that the choices
are restricted):
Period 1: P is the ruling party and can choose between the status quo of no lustration (0) and a
moderate amount of lustration, m, which is the ideal point of M;
Period 2: Parliamentary elections take place and a new parliamentary median is elected with
the following probabilities (for the extreme parties A and P, being a median is the equivalent of
winning the majority):
A: p1;
M: p2;
P: (1− p1 − p2).
Period 3: If P is the new median, then they do not introduce any new legislation, since any
change, including reverting to 0, would result in an unacceptable loss of credibility in the eyes of
their electorate.
If A is the new median, then they can choose any law.
If M is the new median, they coalesce with the larger partner A. M’s approval is necessary
for any new law. If the existing legislation is 0, A proposes new legislation and then M
must either accept or reject it. If the existing legislation is m, A proposes no new legislation,
anticipating that it will not receive M’s support.
Period 4 (only if M is the new median and the existing legislation is 0): M either accepts A’s
proposal or the status quo prevails.
Figure 4 shows the AL game with the issue space or the outcomes in place of the payoffs.
The game is parametrized by two probabilities, p1 and p2, and the position of the moderate
party, m.
The player strategy spaces are as follows:
ΠP = {0, m};
ΠA = [0, 1]3;
ΠM = 2(0,1].
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   New 
legislator:
A, p1          M, p2                  P, 1-p1-p2            A, p1         M, p2                 P, 1 -p1-p2
   Nature
(elections)
Post-communists
Light lustration = mSQ = 0
0                 1      0               1                           0              1        
AA A
M
Yes             No
   m                     m   0   
Figure 4. Simplified structure of the Auto-Lustration game.
P’s strategy includes the initial choice between light lustration m and no lustration. A’s strategy
involves three scenarios of legislation, depending on what P decided earlier and whether the new
median is A or their coalition partner M. When M is the new median and P did not change the status
quo, M must decide whether to accept A’s proposal or to keep 0. Thus, M’s strategy is, like in the
Agenda Setter model, a subset of acceptable policies that are preferred to the status quo.
The payoffs are the negative distances of the final lustration law from the parties’ ideal points.
We assume that the parties are risk neutral. The game is fairly complex and asymmetric, but the
calculation of SPE is straightforward with GBI. The subscripts in the partial strategy profiles denote
the player who plays that particular partial strategy.
Step 1: In its terminal set of subgames, due to its position slightly tilted to the right, M prefers
anything to the status quo 0, i.e., SSPE1 = {(0, 1]M}.
Step 2: The SPEs in the three subgames of Period 3 are as follows:
1 and 2: If A wins the majority, they propose the harshest lustration 1.
3: If M is the median and the status quo is 0, A proposes 1, since they know that M prefers 1 to 0.
Applying the above order of listing the subgames, SSPE2 = {(1A1A1A; (0, 1]M)} (i.e., the set of
partial SPEs includes exactly one partial strategy).
Step 3: P chooses between the payoffs in the perfect upgame, reducing the game to a choice
between 0 and m. Introducing a light lustration law is strictly preferable if the expected payoff from
playing m is higher than it is from playing 0:
− p1 − p2 < −p1 − p2m− (1− p1 − p2)m (1)
After simplification, p1m + p2 −m > 0
This is the equilibrium condition for m to be concatenated to the previously obtained partial
strategy profile and to form a unique SPE: (1A1A1A; mP; (0, 1]M). When the inequality is reversed, 0 is
the newly partial strategy profile and the unique SPE is (1A1A1A; 0P; (0, 1]M); with equality, both 0
and m can be concatenated to form two SPEs.
In Hungary and Poland, P won the majority in the 1994 and 1993 elections only because the
rightist parties were fragmented in those early elections and were unable to form a unified bloc. It was
practically certain that, in the new elections, either A or M would win. Note that with p1 + p2 = 1 and
p2 > 0, the inequality is satisfied. Light auto-lustration was a sensible strategy as insurance against the
harsher punishment by the new government. In fact, in both Hungary and Poland, A won the next
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election but M became the new median, and despite many attempts, A was unable to strengthen the
existing lustration law significantly [38].
5.5. Weakly Undominated Strategies in Subgames
A typical voting game may involve a large number of SPEs that are unreasonable. The GBI
algorithm can be modified in order to eliminate such unreasonable equilibria. While the modification
explained below is ad hoc, it is worthwhile to examine how it works in a specific game.
Example 5. Roman Punishment.
Farquharson [39] and Riker [40] analyzed the apparently first recorded case of a voting
manipulation. The letter of the manipulator, Pliny the Younger, reported the story of a decision
made by the Roman Senate. Three groups of senators were deciding the fate of a freedman, who
was possibly involved in the death of a Roman consul. According to the Roman judiciary agenda,
which was clearly quite different from the modern court procedures, the senators needed to decide
first whether the freedman deserved death or not. A negative answer would trigger the next decision,
whether to banish or acquit the freedman. The game analyzed below should have taken place in the
Roman Senate according to its normal agenda. However, it did not happen since Pliny persuaded the
senators to use a simpler plurality agenda in which they voted over the three options simultaneously.
Voting rule: simple majority, no abstention
Round 1 alternatives: d (death) or n (no death)
Round 2 alternatives (if n wins in the first round): b (banish) or a (acquit)
Players (the names correspond to the player top alternatives): A (acquiters), B (banishers), and D
(death penalty supporters)
Player preferences:
A: a preferred to b preferred to d
B: b preferred to a preferred to d
D: d preferred to b preferred to a
Let us convert the player preferences into payoffs in the following way:
3—the top alternative for every player
2—the second-best alternative for every player
1—the worst alternative for every player
Figure 5 depicts the extensive game representing voting according to the Roman agenda.
The game looks simple but the number of SPEs is staggering. H4 depicted in Figure 5 has three
SPEs, i.e., SSPEH4 = {(b; b; b), (a; a; a), (a; b; b)}. When all players vote identically, either (b; b; b) or (a; a; a),
their vote is an NE (and also SPE) since no deviation of one player can change the outcome of voting.
The third SPE, (a; b; b), is when all voters vote for their preferred alternative, i.e., when they choose
their strategies that are weakly dominant in H4.
The remaining three subgames H1, H2, and H3 have a structure that is identical to H4 and have
three SPEs each. Thus, when we prune all four subgames, the set of partial SPEs, SSPE1 , includes 3
4 =
81 partial strategy profiles. There are 24 = 16 possible upgames since in each subgame, either a or b,
can be the equilibrium outcome with the corresponding payoff vectors (3, 2, 1) or (2, 3, 2). Thus, every
subgame may be replaced either with (3, 2, 1) or (2, 3, 2).
At this moment, I abandon calculating all SPEs since the number is large and all of them except
for one have a fatal flaw. Namely, except for the partial strategy profile (aaaa; bbbb; bbbb), in all other
strategy profiles, at least one player plays a weakly dominated strategy in at least one subgame,
i.e., votes for the second-best alternative. Let us consider what happens in the perfect upgame resulting
from this special profile that steers clear of weak domination (aaaa; bbbb; bbbb) (see Figure 6).
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Figure 5. Roman Punishment: Out of four subgames, only H4 is shown.
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n                                                d
n                         d                                         n                          d
   n          d                       n           d                 n           d                        n          d
Figure 6. The perfect upgame of Roman Punishment corresponding to (aaaa, bbbb, bbbb).
A quick calculation shows that the players in our upgame have three SPEs similarly to the four
removed subgames. In addition to (n; n; n) and (d; d; d) that involve at least one weakly dominated
strategy, there is an SPE in weakly dominant strategies (n; n; d). The concatenation of this SPE with the
previously obtained (aaaa; bbbb; bbbb) brings an SPE (naaaa; nbbbb; dbbbb) that has an additional property
that. in all removed subgames and in the final upgame, no player plays a weakly dominated strategy.
It is straightforward to show that, in Roman Punishment, the strategy profile (naaaa; nbbbb; dbbbb)
is a unique perfect equilibrium (PE). All partial strategy profiles are also unique PEs in the respective
subgames. Interesting questions arise: (1) What are the general conditions for the concatenation of
partial PEs to produce a global PE? (2) Can we obtain all PEs that way? and (3) Does the final result
depend on the pruning sequence? Moreover, since any equilibrium concept refining the SPE can be
applied at all stages of GBI, similar questions arise for all other refinements.
6. Conclusions
The contributions of this paper include the following: (a) the axiomatization of infinite games;
(b) a demonstration that BIS and SPE are equivalent for such games for pure and behavioral strategies
of finite support and crossing; and (c) the provision of an algorithm for solving certain games.
Games 2019, 10, 34 20 of 25
Infinite games that I consider may have imperfect information, infinite action sets, and an infinite
horizon. Informally, the algorithm operates as follows (the formal presentation is found in Section 4):
1. Identify the game’s agenda, i.e., the tree consisting of all roots of the game’s subgames that is
ordered by the relation of the successor imported from the game tree. Set the pruning sequence.
2. Prune any subgame according to the pruning sequence and substitute its root with the subgame’s
SPE payoffs. The procedure of substitution may be conducted simultaneously for any subset of
agenda nodes as long as the corresponding subgames are pairwisely disjoint.
3. Concatenate all partial strategy profiles resulting from the substitution.
4. If at any point one receives an empty set as SPE for the subgame, this would mean that there is
no SPE compatible with the set of previously selected SPEs for the subgames.
5. In order to find all SPEs, one needs to try all possible substitutions of the subgames with
SPE payoffs.
6. One stops at the root of the game.
The examples discussed above illustrate the application of the algorithm to complex games that
involve simultaneous pruning of large numbers of subgames (Example 1), continuum of actions
(Example 2), behavioral strategies and imperfect information (Example 3), and parametrized games
(Example 4). Example 5 shows an ad hoc modification of GBI that allows to find the unique perfect
equilibrium in a game that has a large number of unreasonable SPEs.
Three open problems deserve a further comment:
1. Extending the results: An obvious open question is whether the results for behavioral strategies of
finite support and crossing can be generalized to all “rough” behavioral strategies. Attacking this
question would demand leaving the comfortable world of finite probability distributions and
using measure theory in the spirit of Aumann’s [30] pioneering contribution. The framework
presented in this paper goes around measure-theoretic difficulties by assuming finite support
and crossing. Both assumptions imply that the total number of terminal paths that count for
calculating payoffs is finite for every strategy profile. It is easy to identify the places in the proofs
where this fact is used. A natural question, then, is whether the equivalence can be extended.
2. Axiomatization of noncooperative game theory: The general axiomatic framework applied in the
present paper encompasses more games than the classical approaches of von Neumann [4] and
Kuhn [6]. When game theory was born, it seemed natural to consider only finite games; nonfinite
games rarely appeared in the literature. Today, we routinely go beyond the limitations of finite
games, either with a continuum of strategies that represent quantity, price, or position in the
issue space or with the infinite repetition of a game. I believe that contemporary game theory
deserves sound axiomatic foundations that can cover infinite games. This would lead toward
a more unified and complete discipline. Concepts that were axiomatically analyzed for finite
games, such as Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) sequential equilibrium, seem to be obvious targets
for a more comprehensive axiomatic investigation. The present paper demonstrates that new
results or extensions of well-known results can be obtained within the general framework of
infinite games.
3. Modification of BI beyond subgame perfection: The final question is whether backward induction can
be modified for other solution concepts beyond subgame perfection. An immediate ad hoc
modification would consider only those SPEs that exclude partial equilibria with weakly
dominated strategies, as it was demonstrated in Example 5. Perhaps, after a suitable modification
of the main principle, backward induction-like reasoning could also produce some other
refinements. On the other hand, proving that this is not the case would be an interesting
finding as well.
Further refinements of backward induction could produce computational benefits similar to those
obtained for subgame perfection. Backward solving is equivalent to the hierarchical concatenation of
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solutions. Thus, solving a game with backward reasoning is equivalent to collecting together those
independent solutions and connecting the global solution with stage-wise decision-making. Arguably,
this is how all decisions are made.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. The Lemma will be proved for game G. The assumptions of finite support and
crossing apply to the subgames as well as to G, which means that all steps of the proof can be repeated
for every subgame of G.
Part (a): The construction of a terminal path e ∈ Tβ is by induction. Both when τ ∈ T0 and when
τ ∈ Ti for i = 1, . . . , n, there is a node v ∈ SU(τ) such that pmβ (v) > 0. Let us choose v as the second
(after τ) node of the path.
Let us assume that a path e of length l reached a node x. If x ∈ TE, e is the desired path. If x ∈ TD,
let Iki be such that x ∈ Iki . Both when Iki ⊂ T0 and when Iki ⊂ Ti for i = 1, . . . , n, there is a node
y ∈ SU(x) such that pmβ (y) > 0. Path ey ⊂ β and its length is l + 1. The construction either ends at
some endnode or proceeds indefinitely, producing some infinite path. In both cases, the resulting
path e is terminal. By definition of the game and under the assumption of finite crossing, only a finite
number of factors in the product ∏z∈e pmβ (z) is in the interval (0, 1); by construction, the remaining
factors are equal to 1. Thus, pβ(e) > 0 and e ∈ Tβ.
Now, let us assume that Tβ is infinite. We will construct by induction an infinite path e∗ ∈ Tβ that
violates finite crossing. Path e∗ begins with τ. Now, let z be such that (1) ez crosses k ≥ 0 information
sets with nondegenerate probability distributions and (2) {e ∈ Tβ : z ∈ e} is infinite. We will extend e∗
in such a way that the number k from (1) increases and (2) is preserved. By finite support, only for
a finite number of v ∈ IS(z), pmβ (v) > 0; among them, for at least one t, {e ∈ Tβ : t ∈ e} is infinite.
Let us add t to e∗. By construction, et crosses k + 1 information sets with nondegenerate probability
distributions. Extending this construction indefinitely, we find a path e∗ that violates finite crossing.
Part (b): If e /∈ Tβ, then by definition of Tβ, for some x ∈ e, pmβ (x) = 0, which implies pβ(e) = 0.
If e ∈ Tβ, then, by final crossing, 0 < pmβ (x) < 1 only for a finite number of x ∈ e; for all other
y ∈ e, pmβ (y) = 1. This implies pβ(e) > 0.
Part (c): By (a), Tβ is finite and non-empty. The thesis is proved by induction over k, i.e., for all
terminal paths with the lengths shorter or equal to k or nonterminal paths with the length equal to k
included in Tβ.
First, the total probability of reaching the path of length 1 within Tβ is 1 because pmβ (τ) = 1.
Second, let us assume that the thesis holds for all paths f ⊂ e ∈ Tβ that are no longer than k.
Let us consider all such paths that are no longer than k + 1. The sum of the probabilities of reaching
the final nodes of such paths includes two subsets of terms. The probabilities that are assigned to all
paths no longer than k do not change and enter the summation in the same way as is the case for all
paths no longer than k. There may be new terminal or nonterminal paths with the exact length of k + 1.
Here, two cases are possible. First, the probability of reaching the extra node k + 1 is 1. This means
that the term associated with such a path f enters the summation in the same way as for all paths no
longer than k. Second, the distribution at the next-to-final node y is nondegenerate. In such a case,
instead of a single path e that is no longer than k, we now have—by finite support—a finite number of
paths { fl}l∈L that are no longer than k + 1 and that go through y. The total probability associated to
them at node y is 1. Thus, the summation term corresponding to path e is now substituted by a finite
number of terms that add up to the same number. This means that the total probability of reaching the
ends of all distinct paths that are no longer than k + 1 is 1. Since Tβ is finite, finite crossing implies that
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there is a common maximum for the length of the segments, such that the associated probabilities are
smaller than 1. The probabilities associated with reaching this maximum—or a shorter length if the
path ends earlier—is equal to the probability distribution over Tβ and is equal to 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. Part (a): Every subgame H divides the set of information sets of player i into two
subsets. Every βi can be partitioned into two partial strategies, βHi and β
−H
i , defined for those two
subsets the same way βi is defined. First, two different strategies produce two distinct pairs of partial
strategies, since they must differ for at least one information set. Second, every pair of partial strategies
βHi and β
−H
i may result from some partition—namely, from the partition of a strategy that is identical
for all information sets with the pair.
Part (b): It is a simple consequence of (a).
Proof of Lemma 3. A terminal path in s either includes φ or does not include φ. By Lemma 1, the total
number of paths in s is finite; hence, PG(s) can be represented as the sum of the payoffs
PG(s) = Σe∈Ts(H) psG (e)P
G(e) + Σe∈Ts(G−H) psG (e)P
G(e) (A1)
We need to show that the first term in Equation (A1) is equal to the payoff of s in H multiplied by
the probability of reaching φ, the root of H.
If psG (φ) = 0, then, from the definition of psG (e), we have the following:
psG (e) = 0 for all e ∈ Ts(H)
Since the summation is over a finite set, this means that
Σe∈Ts(H) psG (e)P
G(e) = 0 = psG (φ)P
H(sH).
Now, let us assume that psG (φ) > 0. First, notice that
(i) every terminal path e ∈ Ts(H) defines a terminal path of sH in H and all terminal paths of sH in H
can be obtained this way.
Moreover, for every e ∈ Ts(H) and the corresponding eH ∈ THsH , we have the following:
(ii) PG(e) = PH(eH) and
(iii) psG (e) = ∏y∈e pms (y) = ∏y∈eH−{φ} pms (y)∏y∈e−eH∪{φ} pms (y) == psG (φ)× psH (eH)
We can then use (i)–(iii) to make substitutions:
Σe∈Ts(H) psG (e)P
G(e) = ΣeH∈TH
sH
psG (φ)× psH (eH)× PH(eH) = psG (φ)PH(sH).
Proof of Lemma 4. By Lemma 3, it is sufficient to show that
PF(s−H) = psG (φ)P
H(eφ) + Σe∈Ts(G−H) psG (e)P
G(e) (A2)
This follows from the fact that s−H is identical to s for all information sets outside of H and that
all terminal paths for s−H in F, with the exception of eφ, have by definition the same probabilities and
payoffs assigned as in G. For eφ, the probabilities of reaching φ are equal by definition; the equality
PH(eφ)=PF(φ) follows from the definition of F as an (s, H)-upgame of G.
Proof of Theorem 1. (a) → (b): decomposing an SPE strategy profile must result in a pair of SPE
strategy profiles.
Since H is a subgame of G and since sG is an SPE in G, sH must be an SPE for H. We need to
prove that sF is an SPE for F. Let us assume that this is not the case and that we can find J—a subgame
of F—such that sJ is not a Nash equilibrium. Here, two cases are possible:
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Case 1: J does not include φ. In this case, J is disjoint with H. Thus, J is also a subgame of G
and sJ is identical with sFJ . However, (a) implies that sJ is a Nash equilibrium, which also must be the
case for sFJ .
Case 2: J includes φ. Let us assume that there is a player, i, of which the strategy tJi gives a higher
payoff than Pi(sJ), i.e.,
PJi (s
J
−i, t
J
i ) > P
J
i (s
J) (A3)
Let us denote (sJ−i, t
J
i ) as t
J . We will find K, a subgame of G, such that all payoffs in K are identical
with the corresponding payoffs in J. Let K be defined as J, with φ substituted with subgame H.
By construction, K is a subgame of G and sK is a Nash equilibrium in K. J is a (s,H)-upgame of K.
Let us define a new strategy profile in K as tK = tJ ∪ sH . We now apply Lemma 4 to K; J; strategy
profiles tJ , tK, sJ , and sK; and player i:
PKi (t
K) = PJi (t
J) (A4)
and
PKi (s
K) = PJi (s
J) (A5)
Subtracting the respective sides of Equation (A5) from Equation (A4), we obtain a contradiction
with our assumption that sK is an NE in K:
PKi (t
K)− PKi (sK) = PJi (tJ)− PJi (sJ) > 0 (A6)
(b)→ (a): every strategy profile resulting from the concatenation of SPE strategy profiles is SPE.
Let sH be an SPE in H, the subgame of G; sF be SPE in F, the (s, H)-upgame of G; and let s =
sH ∪ sF. We need to show that s is SPE.
Let us assume that this is not the case. Thus, we can find a subgame K of G such that sK is not a
Nash equilibrium. This implies that some player i could improve their payoff against sK−i by playing
some strategy tKi , i.e.,
PKi (s
K
−i, t
K
i ) > P
K
i (s
K) (A7)
I will show that Equation (A7) is in contradiction with (b). Let us denote (sK−i, t
K
i ) as (t
K). Three
cases are possible.
Case 1: K is a subgame of F that does not include φ. By the subgame perfection of F and contrary
to Equation (A7), sK must be a Nash equilibrium.
Case 2: K is a subgame of H. By the subgame perfection of H and contrary to Equation (A7), sK
must be a Nash equilibrium.
Case 3: K includes the node φ and at least one more node from F. In such a case, K must include
all nodes that follow φ and H must be a subgame of K. Let J be the (sK, H)-upgame of K. J is
also a subgame of F. By (b), F is an SPE and both sFH and sFJ=sJ are SPEs in H and J, respectively.
By Lemma 4,
PKi (t
K) = PJi (t
J) (A8)
and
PKi (s
K) = PJi (s
J) (A9)
Subtracting the respective sides of Equation (A9) from Equation (A8), we obtain a contradiction
with our assumptions:
PJi (t
J)− PJi (sJ) = PKi (tK)− PKi (sK) > 0 (A10)
Proof of Lemma 5. First, let us assume that neither the root φ of H follows ψ—the root of J—nor ψ
follows φ. If there is a third node, χ, that belongs to both subgames, then, by definition of the subgame,
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both φ and ψ must be followed by χ. Thus, we could find at least two different paths to χ: one through
φ and one through ψ, which is inconsistent with the definition of the tree.
Now, let us assume that φ follows ψ or vice versa. However, this would imply that the path to
φ in the agenda is longer than the path to ψ (or vice versa) and that the subgames cannot be at the
same level.
Proof of Theorem 2. Subgame perfection of Hθ is assumed on both sides, so we need to prove that s
is SPE for G iff sF is SPE for F.
Part 1: Θ is finite, i.e., Θ = {1, . . . , n}. Theorem 2 follows from applying Theorem 1 in both
directions a finite number of times to a chain of upgames {Gi}i=1,...,n+1 such that G = G1, Gn+1 = F,
and, for i = 1, . . . , n, Gi+1 is the (sGi , θi)-upgame of Gi.
Part 2: Θ is infinite.
(a)→ (b):
Let us check if it is possible to to find a strategy tFi in F for some player i that would offer a higher
payoff in some subgame L of F than s. Let us denote the strategy profile (sF−i, t
F
i ) as t
F. By Lemma 1,
the total number of terminal paths relevant for sF, tF, or tL is finite. Since all subgames with their roots
in Θ are disjoint, this implies that the number of roots in Θ that are part of any such path is also finite.
Let us denote the set of such roots as ∆ and the (s,∆)-upgame of G as K. Since ∆ is finite, sK is SPE in
K by the finite part of the proof (Part 1).
Let us denote as M the subgame of K that has the same root as L. By construction of K, M=L or L
is an (sM,∆)-upgame of M. Since sK is SPE, sM is SPE, and by Part 1 of the Proof, sL is SPE; player i
cannot receive a higher payoff with tLi .
(b)→ (a): The proof is similar to the (a)→ (b) part. The assumption that there exists a strategy ti
that could improve the payoff of player i in some subgame L of G leads to a contradiction. The strategy
profiles s, (s−i,ti) = t, and tL have only a finite number of paths that reach at least one of {Hθ}θ∈Θ.
This allows us to drop an infinite number of subgames from Θ and to construct a smaller subgame
K of L with the payoffs identical to L for respective strategy profiles tL, sL, tK, and sK such that F
is an (sK,∆)-upgame of K for some finite subset ∆ ⊂ Θ. By Part 1, sK is SPE for K, which means
that an improvement in payoff for player i playing sKi is impossible in K, which implies that it is also
impossible for i to improve from playing sLi in L.
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